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In the 21st century, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) have become 
increasingly joint efforts. This trend has led to expanding program complexities and 
interdependencies. The resulting cost, schedule, and performance risks often counterbalance, 
and potentially outweigh, the efficiencies gained through inter-service program designs. We 
define these risks as the cost of commonality.  
Such costs are often unquantified in cost-benefit analyses in the defense acquisitions 
process. In this project, we first review the results of three joint MDAPs to evaluate ex-post 
indications of programmatic shortfalls resulting from commonality costs. We then propose a 
unique cost-effectiveness model to assess value in joint programs from a broader portfolio 
perspective. Finally, we apply our Joint Value Model to the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 
program as a case study to validate the concept.  
The Joint Value Model provides a means for managers to evaluate cost-effectiveness 
in the portfolio context and compare meaningful differences among program alternatives. We 
recommend use of this model as a tool for program analysis at all stages of system 
development.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1907, the U.S. Army Signal Corps solicited for a heavier-than-air flying machine 
in a fixed-price incentive fee contract worth $30,000 (“Military Use of the Airplane,” 
2015). The four-page contract was written such that the Army would pay incrementally 
more for improvements over a threshold speed of 36 miles per hour. Although the Army 
sought full and open competition for this contract, negotiations between the Army and the 
Wright Brothers began two years earlier, in 1905 (“Military Use of the Airplane,” 2015). 
Such arrangements are antithetical to competitive market strategies and illegal by modern 
standards. Yet, the Wright Brothers were one of the few inventors at the time who could 
meet the specifications. This procurement set a precedent for the government in balancing 
technological readiness with the urgency of user needs. It was also the first attempt to 
repurpose technologies across the services, becoming the foundation for modern joint 
programs: In 1911, the Navy purchased the Wright Model B in an attempt to modify it for 
water takeoff (“Military Use of the Airplane,” 2015). It is perhaps portentous that the first 
attempt at joint commonality for a major weapon system ended in failure. The Navy 
ultimately abandoned the Wright Brothers’ design for the prototypes of Glenn Curtis, 
which were made specifically for operating on water.  
The concept that a single materiel solution could meet the requirements of multiple 
services is the fundamental principle of joint programs. The underlying rationale is that the 
benefits of inter-service commonality will outweigh the costs when properly executed. The 
pursuit of joint capabilities has become increasingly pervasive in the modern era. The fall 
of the Soviet Union ushered in the need for new national strategies to address emerging 
threats and non-state actors. The foundational document for this strategy was the Joint 
Vision 2010, published by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1996 (DOD, 1996). The 
principal concept was that no single military service would be able to defeat emerging 
asymmetric threats unilaterally. A synergistic capacity among agencies and departments 
would be necessary to accomplish national security objectives. To meet this intent, 
effective materiel solutions are often required to facilitate joint capabilities in the 
operational environment. This requirement has since driven the ever-increasing need for 
jointly developed solutions in defense acquisitions.  
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Despite the increasing necessity of joint solutions, a review of joint Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) reveals a 
history of extensive cost growth, schedule overruns, and performance shortfalls. These 
consequences result in part from the innate complexity of pursuing commonality on a large 
scale. In 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) argued that many of the 
requirements for joint programs such as sharing domain information, policy and processes, 
technology, legal restrictions, and cultural barriers all impede the ability to benefit from 
joint capabilities. The decision to pursue a joint program begins with a cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) and an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to ensure that joint commonality is the 
preferred solution. As the program evolves, managers consider trade-offs through a process 
of Cost Informed Trades Assessment (CITA). Despite these processes, underperformance 
remains prevalent in joint MDAPs.  
We hypothesize that current analyses fail to account for inherent complexity risks, 
which often diminish or outweigh the economic and operational benefits of commonality in 
joint programs. We define this consequence as the cost of commonality. In this project, we 
review the results of three joint MDAPs to evaluate ex-post indications of programmatic 
shortfalls resulting from commonality costs. Additionally, in order to capture these hidden 
costs, we take a unique approach to evaluating cost-effectiveness by proposing a model that 
examines the value of joint programs from a broader portfolio perspective.  
We observe that intrinsic tensions exist in combat systems among requirements for 
combat agility, which are driven by transportability and mobility needs, and requirements 
for combat power, which are defined in terms of force protection and lethality. Thus, the 
breadth of user requirements can be arrayed on a continuous agility–power spectrum, in 
which the attainment of functionality on one end often necessitates trade-offs on the 
opposite end. Joint and intra-service programs seek to incorporate a broad range of 
requirements on this spectrum with a common system or family of systems. However, 
programs often experience scope contraction over time as the range of included 
requirements narrows. Such contractions expose capability gaps in the force as peripheral 
requirements are left unmet by the common system. This generates negative externalities in 
the broader capabilities portfolio, increasing costs in other programs to address unmet 
requirements. 
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We theorize that scope contractions result, at least in part, from the inherent cost of 
commonality. Such costs often force programs to narrow the range of included 
requirements or increase funding investments over time to sustain original projections. 
Thus, our proposed cost-effectiveness model, which we term the Joint Value Model, seeks 
to capture these costs by evaluating the program in portfolio context. By including potential 
externalities in program assessments, the model can provide a means for better-informed 
decisions, resulting in improved cost-effectiveness in DOD acquisition portfolios. In order 
to validate the Joint Value Model as a concept, we apply it to the Joint Light Tactical 
Vehicle (JLTV) program as a case study. Our principal intent is not to evaluate the JLTV 
program specifically; rather, our goal is to assess the usefulness of the model as a tool for 
capturing the non-monetized costs of commonality and facilitating more comprehensive 
analysis in joint programs.  
We find significant scope contraction in the JLTV program over the course of its 
development. Decisions to divest of several JLTV requirements were necessary and 
appropriate from the program perspective but resulted in reduced cost-effectiveness in the 
portfolio context. The Joint Value Model provides insight into the broader consequences of 
JLTV program decisions and offers a suitable tool for evaluating alternative courses of 
action throughout the development process.  
While the scope of this project includes only one detailed case study, the Joint 
Value Model provides useful applicability in the assessment of large joint and intra-service 
programs by allowing managers to compare meaningful differences among program 
alternatives and assess value within capability portfolios. The model is also scalable, as it 
offers a means to compare value assessments among different portfolios, informing funding 
decisions at the highest levels. However, incorporation of the Joint Value Model requires a 
paradigm shift with respect to how programs are currently assessed and funded. The 
responsibility of program managers increases as the required scope of consideration in the 
decision-making process widens. As such, managers should be granted greater authority 
and funding flexibility in order to maximize value for the DOD.  
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II. THE VALUE OF COMMONALITY 
A. THE BENEFITS OF COMMONALITY 
The economic concept of division of labor, to the extent it can be achieved, 
generates a proportional increase in productivity (Smith, 1775). This is the concept for 
economies of scale, which defines the improvements in efficiency that result from 
increased production volume. The automotive industry has been one of the greatest 
beneficiaries of this principle. However, these commonality benefits are not easily 
transferrable to the defense industry. Even for platform-centric systems like the JLTV, 
economies of scale are limited by small quantities (49,550 vehicles from 2015 to 2035 
with 4 variants). In comparison, the Ford Motor Company, which continues to decrease 
their overall number of global platforms (see Figure 1), reported global annual sales 
volumes of 5.6 million to 6.3 million1 vehicles from 2012 to 2014 (Ford, 2014). 
Figure 1.  Ford Global Platform Consolidation 
 
Source: Ford Motor Company. (2014). Annual Report Form 10-K. Retrieved from 
http://corporate.ford.com/annual-reports/annual-report-2014/files/201_Ford_Annual_ 
Report_sm.pdf 
                                                 
1 Ford vehicle sales volume numbers were calculated using the Ford Motor Company Form 10-K and 
their estimates of (1) global sales volumes and (2) Ford’s estimated global market shares. 
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The auto industry relies on a competitive market that allows consumers to choose 
among several automakers. Consumer selectiveness, however, is tempered by a market 
dominated by the few players who can achieve significant economies of scale in order to 
provide cheaper goods. When those economies of scale are not realized, as was the case 
with the U.S. auto market “Big Three” during the 2008–2010 automotive industry crisis, 
it is not profitable to simply produce goods with common parts. Specifically, fuel-
inefficient sport utility vehicles and pickup trucks, which had previously flourished under 
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, were no longer in high demand, and thus no longer 
profitable (Vlasic, 2011). Ultimately, production quantities remain an important 
consideration for military procurement, driving central aspects of program acquisition 
strategies. 
While the military may not benefit greatly from high production volumes, there 
are shared operational and economic benefits when U.S. forces conduct joint operations. 
The cost savings of supporting and maintaining the equipment and vehicles of multiple 
services with a common logistical trail is substantial. Logistically burdensome items, 
such as tires, tracks, engines, and transmissions, tend to dominate bulk storage, creating a 
tremendous footprint and driving up life-cycle costs (Held, Newsome, & Lewis, 2008). 
Common logistics warehouses and distribution centers that support system sustainment 
are important mechanisms for lowering costs. Further, inter-service commonality 
generates operationally synergistic effects in the joint environment. Organizations thus 
achieve greater efficiency through higher system interoperability, resulting in improved 
combat effectiveness.  
Commonality also provides training benefits to operations and maintenance 
personnel. Specifically, when commonality is implemented in the design phase, common 
components can reduce training demands for operators and armament crews if the 
components or systems they intend to replace are relatively complex (Held et al., 2008). 
Increased commonality also leads to a reduction in the number of specialized operators 
necessary for equipment. In the airline industry, budget carriers such as Southwest 
Airlines and Ryanair have accomplished this by operating a single airframe (Treacy & 
Wiersema, 1995).  
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This reduces the amount of training and the number of specialized licenses 
required. In the military, such consolidation strategies can result in fewer necessary 
certifications and potentially fewer military occupational specialties needed for operators 
and maintainers (Held et al., 2008). 
Risk pooling is a further advantage of commonality (Chopra & Meindl, 2001). By 
combining the funds of multiple services, the DOD can disperse programmatic risk while 
permitting access to greater resources. By expanding the scope of stakeholders, joint 
programs broaden the operational, economic, and political consequences of failure. This 
raises the priority and visibility of a program, often ensuring its survival in the wake of 
budget fluctuations. Regardless of program performance, vested stakeholders will 
inevitably act to secure interests and prevent organizational failure.  
Finally, commonality within a system or family of systems can provide reduced 
research and development (R&D) costs when deliberately implemented from early design 
stages. Ultimately, if the components of a new system consist of items within the existing 
inventory, R&D costs for that component are reduced to zero (Held et al., 2008). For the 
military, while common engines and transmissions may be difficult to reuse during 
development due to unique and diverse mission sets, utilization of existing test equipment 
and maintenance facilities become significant cost savers. 
B. THE COSTS OF COMMONALITY 
The costs of commonality manifest in numerous ways but derive principally from 
the innate complexities demanded by the pursuit of large-scale programs. The DOD is 
pursuing joint solutions with perhaps insufficient insight into the associated risks of these 
complexities (Brown, 2011). This paradigm is not unique to defense acquisitions. Ninety 
percent of “megaprojects” throughout the world run over schedule and/or over budget, 
while delivering less in terms of performance than original estimates.2 This reality places 
at risk the viability of projects and often hinders economic growth in affected 
                                                 
2 A “megaproject” is defined as an exceptionally large-scale venture, typically costing more than U.S. 
$1 billion in total investment. Megaprojects are categorized by extreme complexity with significant impacts 
on affected environments, communities, and budgets (Flyvbjerg, Buzelius, & Rothengater, 2003).  
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populations. Proponents of megaprojects are incentivized to disguise such risks from 
public and private decision-makers to ensure project approval. As a result, leaders are 
disposed to agree to unrealistic project objectives at the outset. Due to the enormous 
investment required to pursue megaprojects, government balance sheets can be affected 
for many years by the outcome. Failure can result in the collapse of firms and even 
government entities (Flyvbjerg, Buzelius, & Rothengater, 2003).  
One notorious example is Boston’s Central Artery Tunnel Project, also known as 
the Big Dig. This megaproject was the most expensive highway construction effort in 
U.S. history. It was finally completed in 2007, 190% over budget and nine years behind 
schedule. The ultimate economic cost to Boston for the Big Dig is staggering. The final 
sum of $22 billion in principal and interest will not be paid off until 2038 (Moskowitz, 
2012). The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a comparable example within the DOD. 
Similarly plagued with cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls 
spanning two decades, JSF remains an active program. Like other megaprojects, the 
success of JSF has become critical for its sponsors. Despite numerous costly setbacks, the 
DOD has reinvested continuously to prevent JSF program failure. Megaprojects require 
an intense focus on risk management to mitigate negative consequences. Where possible, 
managers should instead limit project scope and partition objectives into separate projects 
of manageable scale (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).  
While no other joint MDAP has reached the scale of JSF, the megaproject 
phenomenon is broadly applicable in defense acquisitions. As MDAPs become 
increasingly joint endeavors, the resulting expansion of scale and scope broaden the 
aperture of risk, typifying megaprojects worldwide. Such risks in the complexity of joint 
MDAPs are critically under-examined. The defining nature of “jointness” is the resulting 
amount of interdependencies among stakeholders and programs. Without a deeper 
understanding of the risks that such largely interdependent efforts encounter, it is 
impossible to isolate critical governance mechanisms that can mitigate cost, schedule, 
and performance shortfalls (Brown, 2011).  
Complex interdependence leads to a value chain in joint programs that is “laden 
with junctions and bifurcations where delay, defection or shirking can occur” (Brown, 
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2011, p. 7). The pursuit of joint capability expands the intricate network of stakeholders 
in which open and permeable boundaries are necessary to achieve common objectives. 
Yet, the open-boundary structure makes it difficult to coordinate and safeguard 
exchanges in complex environments. Social exchange theory holds that uncertainty is 
often the result of interdependence within organizations. Shirking or defection of a single 
network member can have dire consequences for the survival and performance of the 
network as a whole (Emerson, 1976). Military services are independent stakeholders who 
join in strategic alliance for joint programs. Thus, interdependence develops among 
services that typically have competing goals and requirements. This creates a challenging 
environment for system development and program management. As a result, joint 
programs tend to experience higher research, development, testing, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) costs and extended schedules (Brown, 2011).  
Performance optimization is difficult to achieve in complex environments. The 
field of behavioral science is useful in explaining the rational choices of stakeholders as 
members of interdependent networks. As environmental complexity increases, the ability 
of an organization to optimize performance wanes. In a simplistic environment, such as a 
single-service or single-branch acquisition program, the organization requires no utility 
function or complicated algorithm to determine the best course of action. As the number 
of competing goals increases, the ability of an organization to maximize need-fulfillment 
through a process of optimization diminishes. It is most often replaced with satisficing—
a solution that permits the satisfaction of all needs at a minimum specified level. 
Ultimately, common denominators among diverse requirements may not exist or may 
exist only in rudimentary form. Thus, organizations should be skeptical of elaborate 
mechanisms to find converging (or joint) solutions (Simon, 1956). As such, the effort 
required to achieve incremental improvements in optimization is extensive and costly, if 
productive at all. 
Many of the barriers to optimization in complex environments are well 
documented in theories of individual and organizational behavior. The theory of bounded 
rationality describes the fundamental limitations of decision-makers in these 
environments, where a gap exists between reality and perception. 
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While stakeholders are generally rational actors, individual cognitive capacities, 
time constraints, and the limited availability of information hinder decision-making 
abilities. As environmental complexity increases, the interrelated and compounding 
consequences associated with various courses of action outpace the ability of actors to 
process them acutely. The result is a largely intuitive decision-making process in which 
actors perceive acceptable thresholds (Simon, 1978). This leads to satisficing outcomes 
for the broader organization.  
Within the construct of bounded rationality, we can examine the dynamics of 
interdependent networks using game theory. Stakeholders in such networks share a 
common but not identical range of objectives. Parochial interests prevent joint synergy as 
stakeholders seek to maximize provincial outcomes at the expense of collective 
optimization. Thus, rational actions within the network are often undertaken irrespective 
of common goals. This consequence is a social dilemma known as the tragedy of the 
commons. The program structure incentivizes service proponents to exploit common 
resources by insisting on the development of custom requirements. This increases 
development costs and schedule demands while forcing undue performance trades 
(Moore, Novak, Collins, Marchetti, & Cohen, 2014).  
Opportunistic behavior and suboptimization also result from transaction costs in 
complex systems. The field of transaction cost economics (TCE) arose from the notion 
that markets and systems are not frictionless environments. Transaction costs arise 
through exchanges among internal and external actors. Primarily, these costs are 
associated with coordination and motivation problems such as search and information, 
bargaining and decision, and policing and enforcement. They also manifest in the 
promotion of productive effort and deterrence of opportunistic behavior. TCE can 
provide substantive input into the development of MDAP cost estimates. An important 
insight of TCE is that firms should consider both production and transaction costs in 
business decisions. The current DOD analysis structure uses work breakdown structures 
to evaluate costs and does not account for relationship-oriented dynamics. Thus, it 
overlooks transaction costs. This contributes to overly optimistic estimates. Therefore, 
program cost growth will have ex-ante indicators that relate to TCE.  
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Inversely, cost growth is an ex-post indication of hidden or unanticipated 
transaction and production costs. By including TCE considerations, the DOD can 
improve cost-estimation methodologies and mitigate program cost growth (Angelis, 
Dillard, Franck, & Melese, 2008).  
Behavioral and transaction cost theories only partially explain the program 
dynamics that erode joint commonality. Conceptual designs for complex systems in 
industries such as aviation, satellites, automobiles, and semiconductors often exhibit high 
degrees of commonality. However, as designs progress, small alterations force a 
continual drift away from commonality, a phenomenon termed “divergence.” The net 
effect of divergence can be substantial; intended commonality across large subsystems 
can devolve into commonality only among low-level and lower-cost components. There 
are multiple contributing factors. Commonality breaks down as user needs evolve and 
refine, development teams fail to adequately coordinate and synchronize, and new 
technologies integrate into the system. These factors are most prevalent and 
consequential in projects with greater complexity and economic scale, such as joint 
MDAPs. To mitigate divergence and extract the benefits of commonality, managers must 
emphasize four concepts. First, shift organizational focus from individual products to 
product families and modify the development process accordingly. Second, align 
incentives toward beneficial commonality rather than individual products and 
requirements. Third, actively manage commonality over the course of the entire life 
cycle. Finally, be realistic and do not pursue commonality as an end in itself. Managers 
should consider the associated trade-offs and consequences in all business and production 
decisions (Boas, 2008).  
The pursuit of commonality in large-scale programs may also diminish product 
value to the user. In the commercial market, design configurations with commonality are 
desirable when net savings accrue in manufacturing and design. However, such designs 
can inhibit the capacity to extract price premiums though product differentiation. This 
can manifest as a real or perceived value disparity. Thus, substantial coordination among 
system stakeholders is critical to evaluating the value of common configurations and 
informing sound business decisions (Desai, Kekre, Radhakrishnan, & Srinivasan, 2001).  
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While revenues and profitability are not the objectives of defense acquisitions, the 
commonality–differentiation trade-off is a transferable principle. Product utility, or value, 
with respect to the warfighter may diminish when common solutions fail to address 
diverse needs adequately. Intuitively, the more functions that a common system seeks to 
achieve, the less effective it becomes at any given function. This may induce suitability 
concerns in the operational environment if development efforts do not adequately 
incorporate the user community.  
To summarize, the costs of commonality pervade all aspects of large-scale 
projects and programs, diminishing product value. The pursuit of large-scale 
commonality results in complex interdependencies among stakeholders. Such networks 
generate considerable risk in the value chain as parochial interests create incentives for 
opportunistic behavior at the expense of collective optimization. The associated 
transaction costs and suboptimal performance can have dramatic adverse effects. These 
conditions often lead to divergence over time, in which the commonality of original 
designs, and thus the intended benefit, is diluted. Where achieved, commonality benefits 
can be further offset by the reduced utility of non-specialized products. 
C. ASSESSMENT OF COMMONALITY IN JOINT PROGRAMS 
These theories of commonality bear relevance to joint MDAPs in the modern era. 
We examine the results of three joint MDAPs through the lens of academic theory in 
order to determine ex-post indications of unanticipated commonality costs. While the full 
CBAs associated with these programs are beyond the scope of this project, the examples 
below illustrate the challenges of pursuing joint commonality on a large scale. These case 
studies provide a basis for our more comprehensive examination of the JLTV program 
and our logic for the application of similar metrics. 
1. Tactical Fighter, Experimental 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s Tactical Fighter, Experimental (TFX) 
program demonstrates acutely the challenges of pursuing joint commonality (Boas, 
2008). In 1961, initial optimism fostered a common goal of one aircraft to meet the 
requirements of all four services (Art, 1968). Within five months, the DOD narrowed the 
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program’s scope to include only Air Force and Navy specifications (Art, 1968). 
McNamara later gave a directive to maintain commonality with an emphasis on Air Force 
requirements. As a result, the Air Force eventually procured 562 of the initially 
anticipated 1,762 aircraft while the Navy program was canceled due to an inability to 
meet user requirements. The direct costs attributed to the Navy program’s cancellation 
are estimated at $400 million in fiscal year (FY) 1969 dollars, or $2.6 billion in FY2015 
dollars. Additionally, the DOD incurred tremendous operational and economic costs in 
subsequent years as a result. Each service developed unique platforms, and the residual 
lack of commonality in the joint environment perpetuated operational inefficiencies 
(Boas, 2008). Thus, not only did the DOD not achieve the intended benefits of joint 
commonality in the F-111A, but the assessed program value was also outweighed by the 
opportunity costs of alternative single-service acquisition strategies. Congressional 
investigations of the TFX contract later revealed that the Air Force received a 
compromised and dramatically less capable system in the F-111A than if an independent 
program had been pursued from the outset (Boas, 2008).  
Congressional hearings further concluded that critical failures in the TFX program 
resulted from divergence, which evolved from a lack of proven commonality at inception. 
In order to justify moving forward with a joint program, a rigorous systems engineering 
process must be applied to show that significant system commonality will exist at the 
time of production. During the investigation, Senate committee chairman John McClellan 
remarked that “to make 80 percent of the parts common and build planes for all these 
missions … I don’t believe anyone can say that was a proven judgment” (TFX Contract 
Investigations, 1963, p. 971). Failing to satisfy component commonality to a 
predetermined level will result in increased program costs. As with the TFX, when the 
commonality of parts falls below a specified threshold, the systems are no longer 
common. The program is then de-scoped and partitioned into multiple programs. The 
earlier in the life cycle this decision can be made, the greater the costs savings to the 
program and the broader portfolio. It is incumbent upon program leadership to present 
this information to decision-makers early enough in the life cycle to facilitate these 
savings.  
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2. Joint Strike Fighter 
The issue of divergence has also plagued the JSF program. The goal of the JSF is 
to “develop and field an affordable, highly common family of next-generation strike 
aircraft for the United States Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and allies” (DOD, 2015, 
para. 1). The DOD initially intended to incorporate 11 stakeholder nations and replace 13 
individual aircraft with the JSF (Boas, 2008). It anticipated significant operational and 
logistical cost savings through design of a common airframe. The DOD envisions further 
efficiencies as a result of international cooperation, relying on a global logistics footprint 
common to allied partners. The success of this strategy is contingent upon the 
achievement of commonality among major subsystems and effective integration thereof. 
Through consolidation or cancellation of existing programs and the 
creation of the tri-variant JSF program, the U.S. Government drove 
significant savings relative to the alternative of three independent 
development programs. The high-level vision of a common air vehicle, a 
common engine, and a common manufacturing line created the proper 
starting point. (Boas, 2008, p. 95) 
While the economies of scale and the logistics savings will not be recognized 
until the system is fully fielded, the current status of several program metrics has 
generated significant concerns from Congress. Program challenges have forced decisions 
affecting overall procurement quantities, system configurations, and the number of 
participating allies. In oversight of the program, the GAO reports significant cost, 
schedule, and performance problems (GAO, 2015). The JSF has become the most 
expensive and ambitious DOD acquisition program in history with estimated acquisition 
costs of nearly $400 billion (GAO, 2015). Much of the cost increases have come through 
a differentiation of technology needs for the three variants, such as the United States 
Marine Corps (USMC) requirement for short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) and 
the individual software requirements to support all variants (Boas, 2008).  
As the JSF proceeded to the engineering, manufacturing and development phase, 
the program office realized that in order to meet STOVL requirements, significant size, 
weight, and power (SWAP) modifications from the base design would be needed. 
Concerned about the resulting program risk, the Secretary of Defense placed the STOVL  
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variant on a two-year probation and decoupled the program variants in 2011 (GAO, 
2015). The GAO concludes that while this restructuring caused cost increases and 
schedule growth, the decision was necessary in order to achieve overall program success 
and ultimately recouple the program variants. The required modifications, however, 
ultimately correspond to a decrease in commonality among the variants and a significant 
increase in the complexity of the USMC variant (Boas, 2008). 
The primary cause of system divergence due to software is the commonality 
metric selected during the system demonstration phase. In short, the commonality metrics 
for the JSF during system demonstration did not include software, while the primary 
design metric, airframe weight, did not adequately account for disparate software 
requirements (Boas, 2008). As a result, software became and continues to be a major 
driver of cost growth. JSF software designs and integration requirements have increased 
complexity and decreased system commonality. Specifically, while the program 
anticipated 45% growth in software testing for 2014, the GAO observed 90% system 
growth (GAO, 2015).  
These realities have made system-optimization efforts extremely challenging, 
which has led to satisficing solutions. Further, the enormous organizational bureaucracy 
necessary to accommodate all service and international stakeholders has resulted in 
substantial transaction costs. This has contributed to increasing divergence and climbing 
program costs as the DOD continues JSF development. 
3. Joint Tactical Radio System 
The DOD Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radio program 
was intended to provide a radio that would be interoperable with both advanced 
networking and legacy waveforms to support operations in an “Internet-like environment 
for battle command, sensor-to-shooter, and survivability applications” (Kendall, 2011, p. 
1). The priorities for this program were to address capability gaps in information warfare 
and to facilitate the goal of a fully digitized battlespace (DOD, 1997). The complexity of 
the JTRS program is epitomized by its description as the “backbone of the Future Combat 
System” and its requirement to link 18 manned and unmanned systems across the 
battlespace (Feickert, 2005). The original program organization relied on the 
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simultaneous development of five different systems, or “clusters,” by four different 
service leads, as identified in Table 1 (Feickert, 2005). 
Table 1.   JTRS Clusters 

































Adapted from: Feickert, A. (2005). The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the 
Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RL33161). 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, p. 2. 
Additionally, the requirement existed for overall integration of capabilities and 
products from Boeing, Northrup Grumman, Rockwell Collins, BAE Systems, Harris 
Communications, General Dynamics, and Thales Communication (Feickert, 2005). Based 
on these metrics, it is clear that the number of stakeholders adding to the complexity of 
the program architecture presented a formidable management challenge that compounded 
program risk. Yet, this reality was independent of assessments for JTRS technology 
maturation and cost goals, and thus was not included in cost analyses. Acting 
Undersecretary Frank Kendall cancelled the program in 2011 due to “inadequate 
affordability analysis at inception” and “the technical challenges of mobile ad hoc 
networks and scalability” (Kendall, 2011, p. 1). The JTRS program clearly demonstrates 
the impact of complexity and interdependency, as well as the need for better evaluation 
metrics in joint MDAPs.  
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III. THE JOINT VALUE MODEL 
A. A NEW APPROACH 
The value of a program can be measured by examining the effectiveness with 
which it meets the breadth and depth of user needs. In order for a program to meet a 
specified requirement, it typically must make trade-offs with respect to resources or 
design that limit its ability to meet other requirements. Budgetary constraints often limit 
development to a narrow range of objectives, while physical realities may prohibit the 
attainment of competing requirements within a common system. This is the fundamental 
principle that defines the scope of a program. Thus, the goal in all programs is to balance 
competing objectives in order to achieve an optimized capability for broad and effective 
application in the operational environment. As noted, optimization is increasingly 
challenging as the scale of complexity rises. This constitutes the fundamental challenge 
of joint MDAPs, to incorporate a diverse range of requirements through system 
commonality. Joint programs emerge when the inter-service community assesses the 
optimal range of requirements to be feasible within a common system or family of 
systems.  
In commercial industries, a broad array of trade-off dynamics can influence 
system development. Attributes such as the level of reliability, the extent of 
interoperability, or the scale of produceability may dictate design parameters. While such 
tensions are applicable in combat systems as well, the nature of the expeditionary 
environment in the context of ground, air, and maritime warfare tends to define and 
distribute critical capability requirements across a broad spectrum. On one end, 
requirements reflect the need for combat agility: speed, mobility, transportability, and so 
forth. On the other end, requirements prescribe combat power: lethality, protection, 
survivability, and so on. This agility–power spectrum is ubiquitous in defense 
acquisitions. It is applicable and scalable to nearly all combat systems, from soldier-
carried equipment and armored vehicles to fighter aircraft and combat ships. The Army 
organizes its force structure with respect to this capability spectrum. It optimizes Infantry 
Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) for combat agility and Armor Brigade Combat Teams 
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(ABCT) for combat power. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) offer capabilities in 
the middle range of the spectrum. Within the portfolios of each brigade combat team 
(BCT), the Army seeks to balance capabilities to maximize combat effectiveness. 
When a system or portfolio becomes unbalanced on this spectrum, the result is 
reduced combat effectiveness. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s 
Capability Manager for the IBCT (TCM-IBCT) has identified this imbalance as a critical 
concern. The ever-increasing weight of combat equipment in infantry units has led to an 
excessive physical burden for dismounted soldiers. This has diminished the ability of 
IBCT units to maneuver effectively. TCM-IBCT cites this concern as the most critical 
capability gap for the formation. Conversely, LTG H. R. McMaster, Director of the Army 
Capabilities Integration Center, believes that recent trends in maneuver portfolios have 
driven capabilities too far to the agile end of the spectrum in many cases. He advocates 
for renewed emphasis on combat power in ground combat systems (Freedberg, 2015).  
To assess the effectiveness with which programs address the spectrum of user 
needs, we propose a quantitative evaluation model. Each user need in a capability 
portfolio can be examined individually to determine how many total systems in the force 
require that specification. The summation of these needs across users is a measure of 
requirement density, quantified in number of systems. This is not simply a calculation of 
the number of total systems required by the force; rather, it is an assessment of each 
individual requirement to determine how many systems need that specification. For 
example, unit A may require 100 systems to meet its needs, but only 70 of those systems 
require specification X and 80 require specification Y. In this case, the densities of 
specification X and Y for unit A are 70 and 80, respectively. This assessment is repeated 
for each relevant unit in the force. The summation of these values represents the total 
requirement density for each portfolio specification. If these results are arrayed on the 
agile–power spectrum relative to one another, the result is a graphical distribution of 
requirement densities. On this spectrum, capabilities positioned at the center reflect the 
most common functions in the most probable environments, while peripheral 
requirements represent unique capabilities for more extreme or specialized scenarios and 
missions.  
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Therefore, the density graph for a given portfolio will likely depict a bell-shaped 
curve resembling a normal distribution (see Figure 2). Thus, while a joint or intra-service 
program will seek to capture the broadest possible range of requirements, potential 
commonality benefits are highest at the center of the spectrum where density is greatest.  
Figure 2.  Portfolio Requirements Density Curve on the Agile–Power Spectrum 
 
 
However, we speculate that physical, programmatic, and economic realities 
invariably limit the scope of joint programs to a narrow range of user needs. Beyond this 
limit, common systems are inadequate to meet the diversity of requirements. Thus, at the 
periphery of the curve are requirements that must be met by other programs or remain 
unfulfilled (see Figure 3). If a program fails to meet the intended range of requirements, 
these capability gaps constitute negative externalities for the broader portfolio. As such, 
the breadth of program scope dictates the economic and operational benefits of product 
commonality. If the scope is broad, production and logistics cost savings will be high, but 
the attempt to incorporate a wider range of requirements will increase development costs. 
Suitability issues may also arise with less system specialization. If the scope is narrow, 
the inverse will result, and negative externalities will increase.  
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Figure 3.  Portfolio Requirements Density Curve: Joint Program Scope 
 
 
The agile–power spectrum does not fully encapsulate the diversity of user 
requirements. Unique specifications will invariably exist in parallel to the spectrum, 
extending this diagram to a multidimensional model. For example, reliability, 
availability, and maintainability attributes will drive resource and performance trades 
across the spectrum. However, such requirements are typically not distinguishing 
characteristics dictating program scope. Thus, for the purposes of this study, we project 
the distribution of requirements on a single-dimensional scale, the agile–power spectrum.  
The effectiveness of a given portfolio, as defined in the context of this model, is 
the total utility of meeting all requirements in the portfolio. The magnitude of this utility 
is dictated by the number of weapon systems in the entire force possessing each 
requirement on the spectrum. Thus, the effectiveness value can be viewed as a 
measurement of the overall capability provided by the portfolio when all user needs are 
satisfied. We conclude that effectiveness is a volumetric measurement of requirement 
densities. For our two-dimensional model depicted in Figure 3, we define this as the area 
under the requirement density curve. In practical terms, the density of each requirement 
can be measured discretely. 
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 Therefore, this model (shown in Equation 1) calculates effectiveness (E) as the 
sum of requirement densities across the requirement spectrum, where Dx = the density of 







=∑        (1) 
The unseen costs of commonality heavily influence program scope. Inherent 
complexities and interdependencies, organizational satisficing, and transaction costs 
contribute to commonality divergence and sub-optimal solutions. This affects program 
boundaries in a meaningful way. In general, these consequences act as programmatic 
constraints, forcing a contraction in the breadth of scope over time. The result is reduced 
product utility from original designs. Programs can mitigate scope contraction with 
increased resource investment. Yet, such strategies intensify complexity, resulting in 
higher marginal costs and diminishing returns. Consequently, cost growth and 
underperformance are pervasive in joint MDAPs.  
Traditional methods in CBAs and CITAs define program scope as a constant 
parameter within the context of the program rather than as a dependent variable as we 
have described. The initial CBA and AoA establish the program baseline for requirement 
scope. As noted, this scope rarely expands as the program evolves but often contracts 
over time. Programs often divest of requirements by reducing the number of product 
variants. Managers typically evaluate these decisions based on programmatic concerns 
without regard for externalities in the broader portfolio. The outcome of a CITA is a new 
scope baseline, against which program success is measured. This practice conceals the 
inherent costs of commonality that contribute to scope contraction. Thus, we reason that 
by incorporating externalities into the analysis, such costs are appropriately considered in 
the decision-making process.  
It follows that the monetary cost of portfolio externalities for the DOD is the 
program cost of meeting excluded requirements by alternate means. Therefore, the cost 
parameter of this model is calculated (shown in Equation 2) with estimates of Program 
Average Unit Cost (PAUC) for each weapon system in the portfolio.  
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The model weights each PAUC based on the total number of systems to be produced, or 
the Acquisition Objective (AO) of each system. Each weight is determined by calculating 
the AO of the respective program divided by the sum of all program AOs in the portfolio. 
Therefore, the total cost (C) is calculated as the weighted average of PAUCs within the 
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The cost-effectiveness of a portfolio can then be defined as total cost divided by 
calculated effectiveness, or the weighted average of PAUCs divided by the sum of 
requirement densities (shown in Equation 3). It denotes the cost per calculated value of 





















        (3) 
The Joint Value Model provides a tool for comparative analysis of program 
alternatives that incorporates the costs of externalities generated by scope contraction. 
We propose that it can be incorporated into analyses at all phases of a joint program from 
inception to production. The model is applicable for use in the initial program CBA to 
develop the appropriate baseline for requirement scope. As the program evolves, the 
model can be particularly useful in evaluating alternatives during CITA. It offers the 
DOD a means to address affordability metrics from a broader perspective, whereby 
capturing the true value of programmatic decisions.  
As an ex-post analysis tool, the model can provide an objective metric for 
measuring an improvement or decline in cost-effectiveness over time. This is the 
calculated difference between cost-effectiveness results at two (or multiple) points in 
time. We theorize that a decline in portfolio cost-effectiveness from program initiation to 
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system production is, at least in part, a manifestation of inherent commonality costs. Such 
differences can be further dissected to isolate root causes, which can be related where 
appropriate in analyses of other programs. As a case study, we apply this approach to the 
JLTV program in order to evaluate changes in cost-effectiveness from Milestone (MS) A 
to MS C. We then examine this variance through the lens of academic theory to identify 
causal relationships and draw conclusions, where pertinent, for other joint MDAPs.  
B. APPLICATION IN CURRENT PRACTICE 
The military CBA has become an indispensable tool for evaluation of acquisition 
programs. The general guidelines of the CBA are designed to promote the efficient 
allocation of limited resources via well-informed decisions by key leaders of the federal 
government (White House Office of Management and Budget, 1992). The CBA is the 
recommended technique for formal government economic analysis of programs and is 
directed toward executive leaders. While the CBA provides an objective economic 
approach, current practices lack a consistent and holistic approach for evaluating the 
undefined costs and benefits of programs, particularly in joint MDAPs. An alternative, or 
complementary, approach to the CBA process is a cost-effectiveness analysis, which 
compares costs and benefits in situations where benefits cannot be easily monetized 
(Everly, Limmer, & MacKenzie, 2015). Yet this approach, while useful, fails to 
incorporate the inherent costs of commonality. The relative subjectivity of benefits and 
often-ambiguous nature of cost dynamics make value determinations difficult. 
Consequently, reliable metrics for program cost-effectiveness are unavailable to 
acquisition decision-makers. The Joint Value Model augments these methods to provide 
greater understanding of hidden costs and thus better-informed analysis of program 
alternatives. 
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C. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The principal assumption of this model is that the customer’s preferences 
accurately reflect the value of requirements to the organization, and thus to society. All 
specified requirements are valid user needs, necessitating materiel solutions to mitigate 
critical capability gaps. In addition, the model is a data-intensive construct. The costs of 
collecting and synthesizing necessary data must be compared to the potential benefits of a 
more optimal policy. The value of the model can also be limited by the accuracy and data 
and cost estimates. Therefore, the degree of confidence in data inputs should be taken 
into consideration by producing multiple model variations, accounting for best, most 
likely, and worst-case scenarios. Another inherent limitation is related to calculations of 
effectiveness. The magnitude of utility is reflected in the quantity of user needs; this is 
the requirement density value. The model does not account for the relative importance of 
requirements within the portfolio. In reality, some needs may be more critical for the user 
than others, despite smaller density values. However, such assessments are variable and 
subjective in nature. Thus, in this regard, all approved requirements offer equal utility in 
the model.  
The model injects a paradigm shift with respect to program analysis, requiring a 
broader analytical aperture with greater empowerment and funding flexibility for 
program managers. There are costs associated with such shifts that must be taken into 
account as well. We also acknowledge that a portion of commonality benefits are gleaned 
during sustainment and are not reflected in PAUC estimates. Where possible, Life cycle 
Cost Estimates (LCEs) should be used in place of PAUCs for all systems in the model. 
The accuracy and availability of LCE in early stages of system development are minimal. 
Therefore, life cycle considerations must be applied, in most cases, to broader external 
evaluation criteria. Additionally, the model does not address issues of suitability that may 
reduce system effectiveness. This aspect of the model is examined as a binary variable; 
the program either does or does not meet threshold requirements. In reality, systems 
designed exclusively for a singular purpose or subset of requirements will often provide 
greater utility to the user for that task.  
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IV. JLTV CASE STUDY 
The JLTV program has experienced significant scope contraction over the course 
of its 10-year development, exposing peripheral capability gaps in the LTV portfolio and 
necessitating investment in other platforms to meet the breadth of user needs. This has 
altered portfolio cost-effectiveness for the DOD. We first apply an overview of the JLTV 
program and then proceed to apply the Joint Value Model for analysis.  
A. PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
The genesis of JLTV dates back to a 2005 Army and USMC Light Tactical 
Vehicle Functional Area Analysis. This analysis found that the aging Highly Mobile 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet was inadequate to meet many of the 
new light-wheeled vehicle requirements of force protection, survivability, payload, and 
transportability (Grgurich, 2013). The Joint Chiefs of Staff thus approved the JLTV 
program in November 2006 (Feickert, 2011). The Army and Marines intended to initiate 
the Technology Development (TD) phase of the program as early as October 2007. 
However, John Young, the Defense Acquisition Executive, expressed reservations about 
the maturity of required technologies, writing, “There are several aspects of the strategy 
that raise doubts about our ability to develop and acquire this vehicle fleet in an 
affordable and timely manner” (Sherman, 2007, para. 4). The revised Army and Marine 
TD plan was executed by Request for Proposal (RFP) in February 2008. The JLTV 
timeline was delayed again in 2011 when the Army insisted on equivalent underbody 
protection to the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV; 
Feickert, 2015). This requirement had a substantial impact on overall divergence of the 
system from its original design. In short, the increased protection requirements drove 
significant weight increases. Most notably, it resulted in elimination of the long 
wheelbase Category B variant (Feickert, 2015). The remaining variants include two- and 
four-passenger designs with sub-variants, supporting add-on armor and weapons carrier 
configurations. Joint Program Office JLTV ultimately awarded three engineering, 
manufacturing, and design contracts in 2012 and one production contract in 2015. 
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The Army’s vision for JLTV has evolved over time. The 2014 Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicle Strategy identifies the overall Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) fleet as a 
multipurpose platform, focusing on light, tactical, protected mobility (U.S. Army Deputy 
Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, 2014). This fleet is specifically identified as a mix of HMMWVs, 
Up-Armored HMMWVs, and JLTVs. Original estimates for the JLTV included an Army 
plan in which approximately 85,000 of its estimated 160,000 HMMWVs would remain in 
service through 2025 (Feickert, 2011). Revised JLTV acquisition quantities call for the 
procurement of 49,909 JLTVs for the Army from FY2015 to FY2040 and 5,500 JLTVs 
for the USMC from FY2015 to FY2021 (Feickert, 2015). The current strategy also 
identifies a need for MRAP vehicles to meet the current gap in capabilities from the 
HMMWV to the JLTV. Specifically, the MRAP fleet will “enable mobility in high threat 
improvised explosive devise environments, serve as key leader vehicles, and provide 
medical evacuation” (U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, 2014, p. 15). 
Additionally, the Maneuver Center of Excellence is developing requirements for an 
ultralight Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) and a six-passenger Light Reconnaissance 
Vehicle (LRV) to fill other capability gaps in the LTV portfolio that JLTV was unable to 
meet.  
B. JLTV COST-EFFECTIVENESS  
The intent of this analysis is not to deliver precise or robust measurements for 
evaluation of the JLTV program, but rather to demonstrate a proof of concept with 
respect to the model. To this end, we obtained sufficient data to populate the model and 
make appropriate calculations for assessment.3 Much of the collected data represents 
sensitive information, designated For Official Use Only and inappropriate for open 
release. As such, this study provides a descriptive rather than detailed presentation of 
input values. Only derivative values calculated in the model are presented in full. 
Similarly, we distribute relevant key performance parameters (KPPs) as appropriate on 
                                                 
3 Our calculations for this case study are based on available data at the time of analysis. As external 
evaluators, we are not privy to all of the relevant and most current data pertaining to this assessment. Thus, 
we acknowledge that the accuracy of our calculations is subject to a wider margin of error than should be 
expected for an internal program evaluation. 
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the agility–power spectrum and calculate requirement densities accordingly, but we do 
not detail the specific nature of each KPP in this study.  
To assess the temporal change in cost-effectiveness, we apply the Joint Value 
Model to the LTV portfolio at two points in time, corresponding with the JLTV program 
at MS A and MS C. In measuring the requirement density of the portfolio, we determined 
that while KPP threshold and objective values evolved over time, the fundamental 
requirements remained consistent throughout development. For example, the most 
dramatic change in KPP values was with respect to underbody protection as described 
previously. While this change had a dramatic impact on the program, including 
requirement scope, it did not change the number of vehicles in the fleet requiring 
underbody protection. It only increased the level of protection that each vehicle required. 
Thus, the sum of requirement densities, which represents the calculated effectiveness of 
the portfolio, remained unchanged from JLTV MS A to MS C. A constant value for 
effectiveness will not result in all circumstances, and the model does not require this in 
order to produce valid calculations. In many cases, evolving requirements will generate 
new KPPs or alter densities for existing KPPs. This has not generally been the case for 
the LTV portfolio. Further, the study includes only those requirements that constitute 
distinguishing characteristics of the platform. Requirements for reliability, availability, 
maintainability, trafficability, and so forth are applicable to all vehicles in the portfolio 
and are thus excluded from consideration.  
The model incorporates 13 KPPs on the LTV requirement spectrum. KPPs at the 
agile (left) end of the scale represent requirements for rotary-wing, fixed-wing, and 
seaborne transportability and deployment as well as mobility. On the power (right) end of 
the spectrum, KPPs dictate force protection and payload capacities for cargo, 
reconnaissance, heavy weapons, and mission command requirements. We derived the 
density of each KPP by analyzing current tables of organization and equipment, Army 
tactical wheeled vehicle strategies, approved and developing capability development 
documents, and the published basis of issue plans. These documents provided sufficient 
data to identify, with reasonable confidence, how many vehicles within a formation 
require each specification.  
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The arrangement of requirement densities on the agility–power spectrum reflects 
a generally bell-shaped distribution, with KPPs at the center of the scale exhibiting 
greatest density (see Figure 4). Using these values, we calculated LTV portfolio 
effectiveness to be 211,812. Again, this value is not the number of total vehicles needed 
in the fleet. It is the sum of requirement densities for all KPPs in the portfolio as 
previously defined.  
Figure 4.  LTV Requirement Density of KPPs by Formation 
 
 
At JLTV MS A, the Army and USMC envisioned that the JLTV would replace a 
large portion of the HMMWV fleet and assume their associated mission roles. The intent 
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LTV Requirement Density  
IBCT IBCT (Airborne) IBCT (Air Assault)
SBCT ABCT Military Intel.
Combat Aviation Bde. Fires Bde. Sustainment Bde.
Division Artillary Expeditionary MI Battalion U.S. Marine Corps
CBRN Battalion Civil Affairs Bde (Airborne) Civil Affairs Bde.
TDA Schools Engineer Bde. Mobility Enhancement Bde.
Ranger Regiment Special Operations Signal Bn. HHD Military Police Bn.
Military Police Co. Special Opn. Aviation Rgt.
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platform. Over the course of development and as a result of a program CITA prior to MS 
B, the services narrowed functional objectives for the JLTV to include only the 
requirements represented as KPP 3–10 in this model. The services designated KPP 1–2 
and 11–13 to be met with other platforms or later unplanned increments of JLTV. Four 
separate platforms have been identified to meet these five remaining KPPs.  
The GMV is in development to meet KPP 1–2, facilitating airborne and air assault 
operations in the IBCT. This vehicle will provide a highly maneuverable and 
transportable platform to enhance tactical mobility for light infantry units. The Army also 
currently uses M-ATVs to serve as key leader vehicles across the force. While less 
maneuverable and transportable than the GMV or JLTV, the M-ATV offers greater size, 
weight, and power capacities to facilitate command and control networking (KPP 11), 
which the JLTV is currently unable to integrate. IBCTs also require the LRV to enable 
organic cavalry scout squadrons. This requirement, represented as KPP 12 in the model, 
drives further capacity needs to support equipment and force structures specific to the 
reconnaissance mission. Similarly, KPP 13 dictates requirements for a battlefield 
ambulance with force protection, mobility, and transportability attributes equivalent to 
the JLTV. There is no current initiative to address the ambulance capability gap. Thus, it 
remains an unmet requirement within the LTV portfolio. The mitigation strategy includes 
a recapitalization of the HMMWV ambulance fleet and fielding of MRAP variants in 
prepositioned stock to facilitate contingency operations.  
As the designated joint program, JLTV retains primacy in the model. This means 
that where capabilities overlap among programs, the model selects JLTV as the assigned 
solution. For example, GMV is required to meet KPP 1–7. However, since JLTV meets 
KPP 3–10, GMV is aligned only with KPP 1–2 in the model. The LTV portfolio structure 
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Figure 5.  LTV Portfolio Structure at JLTV MS A and MS C 
 
 
To calculate portfolio cost, we used estimates of program average unit cost 
(PAUC) for each relevant program. PAUC is defined as total program cost divided by the 
acquisition objective (AO), or the total number of systems to be procured. For JLTV, the 
model incorporates reported PAUC values at MS A and MS C. Since JLTV was the only 
designated platform at MS A, this value represents portfolio cost for the model at that 
point in time. For MS C, the model averages PAUC values for each program, weighted 
with respect to AO. The published M-ATV PAUC value is also incorporated in the 
model. The GMV, LRV, and Ambulance platforms are in early stages of development 
and do not have approved PAUC estimates. We derived these values using available cost 
estimate data and projected procurement quantities. In a more detailed assessment of the 
JLTV using this model, a thorough sensitivity analysis should be included to evaluate 
variability in these values. For the purposes of this study, we exclude variability 
assessments, incorporating one estimated value for each PAUC. The calculated portfolio 
costs for our model at JLTV MS A and MS C are $250,000 and $433,512, respectively.  
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C. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
With these portfolio values, we calculated the cost-effectiveness of the LTV 
portfolio to be 1.18 at JLTV MS A and 2.05 at MS B. These values represent the cost to 
attain a single value of utility, or effectiveness. In itself, the cost-effectiveness number 
holds no useful meaning. However, as a tool for comparative analysis, it provides a 
valuable measurement for evaluating courses of action and assessing portfolio value over 
time. In the LTV portfolio, our calculations reveal a decline in cost-effectiveness from 
JLTV MS A to C as it became more expensive to deliver required capabilities than 
originally estimated. This can be also viewed as a reduction in portfolio value.  
As a well-managed and successful program, JLTV is an ideal case study for 
analysis. In the course of development, program leadership made necessary and 
appropriate decisions to divest unattainable requirements and unaffordable platform 
variants. While logical for the program, such decisions were made without consideration 
for the broader portfolio and the potential negative externalities imposed. For example, 
the decision to cancel the Category B variant that supported LRV and ambulance 
platforms generated capability gaps and unfunded requirements in the portfolio. If the 
Joint Value Model had been applied in the decision-making process, it may have afforded 
a better-informed analysis of alternatives. The model would have provided the means to 
evaluate portfolio value by estimating the cost of including the variant in the program as 
compared to the cost of externalities in the portfolio as a result of exclusion. While 
inclusion would have increased JLTV PAUC estimates, it may have produced a more 
favorable cost-effectiveness assessment for the portfolio. If analysts are able to use LCEs 
to evaluate portfolio cost, the model can provide further insight into such alternatives. We 
can reasonably predict that logistical savings through commonality in the JLTV program 
would perhaps make inclusion of the long wheelbase variant more attractive from a 
portfolio perspective.  
The model effectively captures the consequences of scope contraction and the 
hidden costs of commonality. Although a joint MDAP, JLTV experienced contraction 
largely as a result of competing intra-service Army requirements. Yet, the model is still 
useful in assessing the value of jointness in the program. The JLTV was able to 
Acquisition Research Program 
                        Graduate School of Business & Public Policy         - 32 - 
                        Naval Postgraduate School 
 
incorporate USMC-driven requirements for seaborne transportability and mobility while 
achieving Army force protection needs. It is unclear to what extent, if any, these 
requirements drove development cost increases or schedule delays. Further, the 
transaction costs of accommodating the bureaucracies of both services in the 
development process are also not monetized in program estimates. Suitability concerns 
are relevant as well if suboptimal solutions result from USMC-unique requirements. 
Given the small quantity of procurement for the USMC—10% of the AO—even slight 
cost increases resulting from USMC specifications could have a definitive impact on 
cost-effectiveness. The cost to accommodate 10% of the fleet may outweigh the benefits 
of joint commonality. Here again, the Joint Value Model can be applied to evaluate 
alternatives in the portfolio context and determine if a joint solution is the optimal course 
of action. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Current military CBAs and other DOD analyses fail to account for inherent 
complexity risks, which often diminish or outweigh the economic and operational 
benefits of commonality in joint programs. This cost of commonality, when overlooked, 
leads to suboptimal program solutions with detrimental effects on cost, schedule, and 
performance parameters. The JLTV case study provides initial validation of the Joint 
Value Model as a mitigation tool for program assessment. By capturing the cost of 
commonality and broadening the aperture of analysis, our model provides a useful 
methodology to reinforce the current suite of analyses and optimize requirement 
satisfaction. Ultimately, incorporation of the Joint Value Model can contribute to more 
cost-effective solutions and greater value in joint capability portfolios.  
Examining requirements through the lens of a portfolio is not a new concept. 
Capability portfolio reviews have yielded service-centric strategies to include the current 
Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. However, decisions associated with these 
strategies tend to be focused at a senior executive level and are rarely delegated to a 
program or project level. Additionally, these decisions often have negative impacts for 
program and project leadership when divergence occurs from initial baselines. Current 
legislation for acquisition reform, and its role in the future of the National Security 
Strategy, attempts to address cost overruns and technical risk through several statutory 
changes. Language in the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act proposes further 
empowerment of services and program managers with respective penalties to accompany 
the new authorities. If this legislation is approved, tools such as the Joint Value Model 
may provide program managers with additional insight at the portfolio level. While the 
ultimate decision authority for joint programs remains at the DOD level, analysis 
conducted by the program manager has a tremendous impact on the overall success of the 
program. Our analysis indicates that the Joint Value Model has beneficial applicability at 
all stages of program development in assessing alternative courses of action. It is also 
scalable in nature. A comparison of cost-effectiveness figures among portfolios can 
reveal which investments produce the greatest value with respect to warfighter needs. 
Such analysis can inform budgetary considerations at the highest levels.  
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We recommend additional research to provide further validation of the Joint 
Value Model construct. The scope of this project incorporates only one detailed case 
study as a proof of concept. While this study indicates the usefulness of the model 
beyond the examined program, follow-on research should be conducted to determine the 
breadth of valid applicability.  
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